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Abstract
Following major reforms of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 1990, the
roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated, with the relationship
between purchasers and providers governed by contracts. Using a mixed multinomial
logit analysis, we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that
is consistent with the predictions of a simple model, based on contract theory, in
which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting
parties inuence the choice of contract form. The paper thus provides evidence in
support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market
reform.
JEL classication: I11
Keywords: health services, British NHS, physician agency, 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1 Introduction
The British National Health Service (NHS) provides health care that is funded from
general taxation and free at the point of delivery for the vast majority of the UK
population. Prior to 1990 responsibility for both planning, nancing and delivering
hospital services in a given geographical area rested with organisational units called
Health Authorities. Following major reforms in 1990, which are described in detail in
Robinson and Le Grand (1993), the roles of planning and nancing (purchasing) were
separated from responsibility for delivering services (providing). Purchasing was del-
egated to reformed Health Authorities and some newly empowered1 general medical
practitioners (GPs), whilst provision of services was primarily made the responsibility
of hospitals given the status of what was termed an NHS Trust. The relationships
between purchasers and providers were governed by contracts with purchasers and
providers free, within limits, to determine the precise form of those contracts. The
NHS in this period of purchaser-provider contracting, therefore, provides a rare op-
portunity to observe contract choice in the context of health care. When faced with
a new environment of contractual negotiation did the newly empowered purchasers
of health services behave as economic theory predicts?
The specic arrangements that are the focus of this paper were phased out in 1997
but the issues that we explore continue to be relevant, both to the present day NHS
and to other health care systems. For example, the NHS has nowmoved to a system in
which the form of the contract between purchasers (now termed Primary Care Trusts)
and providers is centrally prescribed (see Dixon, 2004), but the 1990-1997 period
allows us to infer how the contracting parties might have behaved in the absence
of this constraint on contract choice. The same is true for other countries where
contract choice is constrained, the details of which can be found in Langenbrunner et
1General practitioners with this power were termed fundholders or fundholding GP practices. In
our data all GPs acting as purchasers must have had fundholding status.
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al (2005).
Whilst there were variations in the exact terms, the contracts used in the 1990-
1997 period took one of four forms, distinguished from one another according to
which observable variables payment was conditioned on. We use two sources of data
to examine whether the observed selection of contracts conforms with the predictions
of a simple model, based on contract theory, in which the characteristics of the health
services being purchased and the characteristics of the contracting parties inuence
the choice of contract form. We nd evidence from both data sets of contracts being
selected consistently with the predictions of that simple model.
The theoretical background for this paper is contract theory as applied to the
purchase of health services. That theory has emphasised the potential costs and
benets that arise when a purchaser conditions payment either on the number of
patients treated alone, for which the simplest arrangement is a xed price contract,
or on the cost of treatment, for which the simplest arrangement is cost reimbursement.
In this approach, the choice of contract is modelled as a reaction on the part of the
purchaser to what McGuire (2000) terms physician agency. One trade-o¤, described
extensively by Ma (1994) and Chalkley and Malcomson (2000), is between the strong
incentives to control cost that result from xed prices and the incentives towards
quality of service that result from cost reimbursement. According to this literature the
form of contract that will most closely deliver what the purchaser requires is sensitive
to the degree of concern that providers have for their patients, whether patients are
free to choose which provider they visit and the extent to which constraints limit the
ability of providers to meet demand. When the cost of a service being provided is
unknown ex ante a further issue that arises in the context of xed prices is that, to
ensure service delivery against adverse shocks, it is necessary to set a high price and
in such circumstances it may be optimal to adopt a cost sharing arrangement, e.g.
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of the kind considered in the context of the US Medicare system by Chalkley and
Malcomson (2002).
Contracts in which payment is conditioned on both the number of patients treated
and the cost of treatment feature amongst the four forms of contract observed post
1990 in the NHS but, in addition, some contracts involved only a xed monetary
transfer. We abstract from the intricacies that have been explored in the health
contracting literature, notably the multitasking aspects of the Principal-Agent re-
lationship, and consider a simple framework in which the concern of the purchasing
agency is to ensure treatment of an appropriate number of patients given uncertainty,
at the time of the contract being written, regarding both the number of patients re-
quiring treatment and the unit cost of treating them. We proxy for other physician
agency concerns by allowing implementation costs (i.e. the costs of writing, nego-
tiating and monitoring a contract) to vary across di¤erent forms of contract. Our
approach is therefore to consider the determinants of the relative value to the pur-
chaser of conditioning payment upon either the number of patients treated or cost
(or both of these), against the benchmark of a xed budget arrangement.
Empirical studies have examined the choice of contract in a variety of contexts:
for reviews see Lyons (1996) and Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2003). These include
studies of agricultural sharecropping arrangements between farmers and tenants (e.g.
Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002, and references therein); labour contracts (e.g. Lazear
and Moore, 1984; Lazear, 2000); procurement (e.g. Crocker and Reynolds, 1993);
contracts between coal mines and power stations (e.g. Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1988,
1990); and studies of franchising (e.g. Lafontaine, 1992), particularly between oil
companies and gas stations (e.g. Shepard, 1993; Slade, 1996). Ackerberg and Bot-
ticini (2002), for example, nd a relationship between the type of crop grown and the
degree of xed/share payment in sharecropping arrangements in Renaissance Tus-
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cany. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) examine the completeness of contracts in air
force procurement and nd signicant relationships with agent and service charac-
teristics. Joskow (1990) nds evidence that contract duration is related to specic
investments for mine-head power stations. Shepard (1993) nds the choice of contract
form between oil companies and gas stations to be related to gas station character-
istics. Corts and Singh (2004) nd contract form for oil-drilling to be related to
the characteristics of the project undertaken and the extent of interaction between
the contracting parties. Thus, despite very di¤erent contexts, these studies all nd
theory-consistent relationships between the forms of contract adopted and the charac-
teristics of the contracting environment. The present paper nds similar relationships
in the context of health services.
The choice of contract form for health services is an area where a comparable
empirical literature is still in the early stages of development. Despite various studies
of the adoption by the US Medicare system of prospective payment, for example
(e.g. DesHarnais et al, 1990; Freiman et al, 1989; Cohen and Spector, 1996; Ellis
and McGuire, 1996; McClellan, 1997), it has not been possible to examine choice
of contract by purchasers because in the Medicare system the form of payment is
prescribed by law. As we have suggested, however, the NHS over the period 1990 to
1997 does allow such choice for local purchasers and so is a testing ground for the
theory as it relates to contracting for health services. An earlier contribution in this
vein is Csaba and Fenn (1997), who use data on the share of income that is xed
(i.e. not volume related) for 71 NHS providers from this period (1992-93) to show
that the choice between xed and volume related payment arrangements is consistent
with a concern on the part of purchasers to secure local capacity when confronted
by capacity constraints. Our paper builds on this earlier contribution in a number
of ways. First, we directly observe contract types rather than infer them from the
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proportion of provider income that is xed. Second, because our contract data include
information on purchasers, we are able to examine empirical relationships between
observed purchaser characteristics and contract choice, and also to control for the
e¤ects of unobserved purchaser heterogeneity. Third, we observe the service type
for each contract and therefore, unlike Csaba and Fenn (1997), we are able to test
predictions about how the nature of the service being contracted for inuences the
form of contract. Fourth, our data sets are larger and taken from the two years either
side of 1992-93. Despite these data di¤erences, and despite a somewhat di¤erent
conceptual framework, we nd evidence consistent with some of Csaba and Fenns
(1997) earlier ndings, e.g. that Trust status (see Section 2.1) can inuence contract
form.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the following section we discuss the
background to the health contracting reforms in the British NHS with a view to
introducing terminology and describing our data. In Section 3, we present a simple
model of choice of contractual form in the NHS. Section 4 describes our data in more
detail, sets out the econometric model and summarises and discusses the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Contracts in the NHS 1990 - 1997
2.1 The Contracting Parties
After 1990 hospitals, which had previously been under the direct control of Health
Authorities, could apply for NHS Trust status whereby they would be given discretion
over employment, remuneration scales and the disposal of assets. This discretion was
subject to limits and reservations and could ultimately be revoked if the appropriate
authority, in this case the Secretary of State for Health, deemed their actions to be
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against the public interest. There has been much discussion regarding the objectives
of these NHS Trusts, see for example Propper and Bartlett (1997), but a consensus
view is that they are not-for-prot organisations. In addition, there are legislative
requirements for them to balance revenue and cost (Barker et al, 1997). To capture
these twin notions of provider benevolence and a strictly enforced budget constraint,
in our theoretical framework we assume that NHS Trusts will take any revenue gen-
erated by a contract and, whenever possible, spend that revenue on treating their
own patients. For some of the time period to which our data refers, some hospitals
had not made the transition to full NHS Trust status. These hospitals were still
at least partially under the direct control of their respective Health Authorities but
nevertheless entered into contracts for the supply of services.
There were two types of purchasers of health services in the period that we in-
vestigate. Within our data, Health Authorities were the most prevalent purchasers.
Whilst there are concerns that Health Authorities may have had objectives that did
not strictly accord with those of government, for the purposes of our analysis we
treat them as welfare maximising purchasers in the tradition of the theory of public
purchasing of health care (Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000).
Compared with Health Authorities, GPs had a much smaller pool of individuals
for whom they were required to purchase health services. Furthermore, GPs have
knowledge of the precise medical conditions of their own patients and thus, relative
to Health Authorities, contracted on behalf of a smaller and better known group of
patients. GPs had to balance the benets of the particular patients they expected to
refer to a hospital with the welfare of their other patients and, hence, it is natural to
consider that their purchasing decisions were motivated by overall patient welfare. It
has been suggested that there were possibilities for GPs to benet from any surplus
of their budget allocation over expenditure, if not through increased income then
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from increased expenditures on their businesses, and that it might, therefore, be
appropriate to model GP purchasers as individual utility maximising economic actors.
For the purposes of our simple theoretical framework we can allow for this possibility
by implicitly allowing for GPs to place a lower weight on patient benets.
2.2 The Contracts
In the rst year following reform the most prevalent form of contract in the NHS
simply specied a lump sum payment from purchaser to provider; these were termed
block contracts. Under block contracts there was no link between the number of
patients treated and the payment. A simple and obvious linkage is to pay a xed
amount for each patient treated; in the NHS these were termed cost-per-case con-
tracts. A more complex, non-linear, relationship between the number of patients
treated and contract value existed in what were termed cost-and-volume2 contracts.
Typically, in this kind of arrangement a xed payment was agreed to cover a number
of patients treated up to some limit, thereafter services being paid for at an agreed
rate per case. We henceforth refer to cost-per-case and cost-and-volume contracts
collectively as volume-dependent-contracts. Some contracts, which became known as
sophisticated block contracts combined a lump sum payment with some alternative
arrangements for determining payment should the number of patients treated, or the
cost of treating them, fall outside of the expected or indicative range. Sophisticated
block contracts did not typically precisely specify what payment would be made in
the event that the indicative number of patients treated was not met, but explicitly
allowed the possibility of ex post negotiation based upon the realised cost and (or) the
number of patients treated3. These sophisticated block contracts became the most
2This term, which was used for these contracts in the NHS, is a misnomer  as an anonymous
referee has pointed out, these contracts have no element of cost dependency.
3The distinction is subtle but one contract type (sophisticated block) explicitly allows for de-
pendency on volume and cost (through renegotiation) and the other (simple block) does not. For
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common contract form by the second round of contracting following the 1990 reforms.
2.3 The Services Being Contracted
Unlike the US Medicare system in which groups of patients with a specic medical
condition Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs)  are subject to individual prices,
contracts in the NHS during this period tended to cover broad categories of services.
For most of the contracts we observe, there are four such broad categories: acute
hospital services, non-acute hospital services, mental health services and community
health services. Since uncertainty regarding demand will be one key consideration in
our analysis, in Table 1 we report a measure of the variability of overall demand for
the rst three types of service in the NHS from 1960 to 1994.4
Table 1: Variability of NHS Services 1960 to 1994
Service Variability about trend growth
Acute 0.11
Non-acute 0.07
Mental 0.04
Acute services included most of the medical and surgical procedures carried out
in hospitals, including those delivered by accident and emergency departments. Most
contracts covered a wide range of acute services. The precise mix of treatments (case-
mix) that might be delivered under an acute contract could, therefore, be expected to
example, a typical sophisticated block contract contains the following statement regarding payment
if volume is below the dened threshold:
"Where projected activity appears unlikely to meet the minimum volume specied
in (paragraph) 6.2 the Authority (DHA) will wish to re-negotiate the Contract Price
on the basis of a marginal cost adjustment or agree with the Service Provider (hospital)
what action is to be taken to achieve it"
4Growth rates are determined from data on total number of Finished Consultant Episodes (FCEs)
in the NHS, 1960-1994 by running a regression ln(Nt) = 0+1t+;where Nt is the number of FCEs
and t is a time trend. Variability is given by the variance of the residuals of the above regression,
which is a unit free measure of variation about trend growth.
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vary considerably and as a consequence the cost per treated patient is also highly vari-
able. Similarly, demand for acute services is more variable5 than for other categories
of service as indicated in Table 1.
Hospital non-acute services involved the treatment of chronic illness or disability
and were largely accounted for by in-hospital care of elderly patients. In the UK as
in the US (see Norton and Newhouse, 1994) there is perceived to be chronic excess
demand and limited capacity for these types of hospital services.
Mental health services have a number of distinctive characteristics as a category
of health care provision (see DesHarnais et al., 1990) and particularly in the context
of the NHS. There is relatively little variation in total delivery of these services over
time (see Table 1) and they constitute a relatively small but tightly dened set of
services. Compared to acute services, and perhaps non-acute services, we therefore
expect the contracting parties to have anticipated less uncertainty regarding both
demand and cost for mental health services.
Community services, which include health visiting and some geriatric at-home
services, are unlike many hospital acute services in that they are likely to be supplied
up to the capacity of the health care system rather than be constrained by demand.
Therefore, as for hospital non-acute services, there is likely to have been less un-
certainty regarding the quantity of such services that were to be delivered under a
contract. This e¤ect is likely to have been strengthened by the di¢ culty in measuring
activity for community services; for hospital services the Finished Consultant Episode
 essentially a count of the number of patients whose treatment is completed  was
the standard measure of activity in the NHS, but no such comparable measure existed
for community services6. As we will discuss below this has implications for the cost
5In part, some of the variation in demand is reected in patients queuing for treatment through
what are termed waiting lists.
6The problems associated with dening contracts for these services are set out in Flynn et al
(1997).
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of conditioning contractual payment upon the number of patients treated.
3 Contract Choice Framework
When the number of patients and the precise costs of treating them are unknown to
the purchaser ex ante, a payment mechanism that makes no allowance for payment
to be adjusted to reect the overall cost of the patients actually requiring treatment
risks either some patients going untreated, or payment in excess of that which is
strictly necessary. Conditioning payment on numbers treated or allowing ex post
re-determination of payment based on cost, however, necessitates costly monitoring.
Furthermore with any reimbursement of treatment costs there is a risk of creating
an incentive for actions on the part of the provider that will be detrimental to the
purchaser. The following model is concerned with elucidating these ideas in a simple
framework.
We suppose that our NHS purchaser is entering into a contract for a particular
type of service as described in section 2 and is concerned with both the number of
patients treated and the cost that it incurs in ensuring that treatment takes place. We
denote the number of patients needing treatment by n and assume that each patient
costs c to treat. Both c and n are random variables with respectively, distributions
f(n) and g(c); which are known to both the purchaser and hospital at the time the
contract is drawn up. The hospital observes realizations of n and c prior to deciding
what treatments it will carry out, but after it has entered into a contract with the
purchaser.
We assume that our purchaser, being concerned with the welfare of patients derives
(increasing and concave) benet of b(nh) from nh patients receiving treatment at the
hospital and must choose a contract which pays the hospital either a lump sum,
or according to either, or both of, the realised number of patients treated and the
10
realised costs of treating each patient. We write this contract in the form of a payment
function P (nh; c): The form of contract specied by the purchaser will, together with
the realisations of c and n, inuence the hospitals decision regarding how many
patients to treat. We denote this choice nh(n; c; P ).
To capture the idea that contracts which are conditioned upon more information
require e¤ort in terms of monitoring and, further, to capture the notion prevalent in
the literature that a contract that ex post reimburses the actual cost incurred weakens
incentives for cost control, we allow for an additional cost of enforcing the contract
of  2 f0; n; cg where 0 relates to a contract in which neither c nor nh are used
to condition payment, n relates to a contract where payment is conditioned on nh,
and c relates to a contract where payment is conditioned on c. We assume that
0 < n < c; capturing the idea that any additional monitoring of the provider is
costly and that treatment costs are more di¢ cult to monitor than the number of
patients treated7. Whilst we do not have direct observations of monitoring costs,
there are a number of purchaser and provider characteristics which are plausibly
correlated with these and which will be discussed in Section 3.2.
The hospital, as noted above, incurs the cost c for each patient treated but is also
itself concerned with the well-being of its own patients and derives a benet which
for simplicity we assume to be H for each patient treated. The xed nature of this
benet, and the fact that it does not mirror the purchasers benet b(:) constitute the
physician agency problem within our framework. For the reasons indicated in section
2 above, we assume that the hospital does not derive any benet from a nancial
surplus that it can obtain under its contract but is simply concerned with the number
of patients it treats and the benets they enjoy, given its budget constraint. We thus
assume that the hospital is benevolent in the sense used by Chalkley and Malcomson
7In particular if conditioning payment on cost reduces incentives to control cost, it may be
necessary to verify the claims of the provider about the sources of any cost over-run, as well as
verifying the actual extent of the over-run.
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(1998). We assume further that the hospital can at most treat N patients on account
of a capacity constraint. Hence, given P (:) the hospital having observed n and c will
choose nh to maximise Hnh subject to P (nh; c)  nhc and nh  minfn;Ng:
Formally the purchasers problem is one of selecting a form for P (:) to maximise
W (C) = Ec;n[b(n
h(n; c; P ))  P (nh(n; c; P ); c)  ] (1)
The best that the purchaser can achieve is a contract, with minimal monitoring
costs, that ensures for each possible joint realisation of n and c that the hospital
chooses nh to satisfy either b0(nh) = c; or (if b0(N) > c) nh = N . We denote this
rst best treatment number by n: In practice the purchaser will have to accept some
deviation from n if it is to economise on monitoring. It is the trade-o¤between ensur-
ing e¢ cient treatment and containing monitoring costs that we view as determining
contract choice.
There are three forms of payment mechanism that are closely analogous to the
contracts that we observe in the post 1990 NHS. A simple block contract species a
payment of B which is paid to the hospital independently of the observed realisations
of nh or c. Under this arrangement, and given our assumptions, the hospital will
choose to treat all patients who arrive to be treated up to the point where its xed
budget B is exhausted. Thus the number treated under a block contract satises
nB(n; c; B) = minfn;B=c;Ng and the purchasers expected welfare from the block
contract is WB(B) = Ec;n[b(nB)   B   0]: Denoting by B the xed payment that
maximises this expected welfare, the best the purchaser can achieve using a block
contract is a welfare of W B  WB(B):
To capture the essence of volume-dependent-contracts, we focus here on the cost-
per-case arrangement, being the simpler payment scheme. With a cost-per-case con-
tract the purchaser species a price per patient treated of p. With this arrangement,
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the hospital will treat all the patients it receives, up to its capacity, provided that
p  c; so that the number treated satises
nc(n; c; p) = minfn;Ng if p  c
= 0 otherwise.
The purchasers welfare from a cost-per-case contract is thusW c(p) = Ec;n[b(nc) 
pnc   n] and again, denoting by p the xed price per patient that maximises this
expression, the best the purchaser can achieve using a cost-per-case contract is a
welfare of W c  W c(p):
Finally, to capture the essential characteristic of a sophisticated block contract,
which facilitates an ex post re-negotiation based upon realised cost, we suppose that
payment under this arrangement ensures that all patients (up to N) are treated by
setting payment Bs = nsc, where ns(n; c) = n. In this case the purchasers welfare
is W s = Ec;n[b(ns)  cns   c]: With this characterisation of the sophisticated block
contract, the purchaser can always ensure ex post rst best treatment numbers but
must incur the monitoring cost c in order to do so.
We suppose that the purchaser will choose its contract rationally so that the
contract chosen will reect the maximum of W B;W c andW s: Under what circum-
stances will the di¤erent forms of contract be chosen? This depends on the type of
service being contracted for and the characteristics of purchasers and providers.
3.1 Di¤erent service types
Consider rst a type of health service for which the variations in both cost and num-
bers treated are small. The overall cost of provision is thus predictable and a contract
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that simply pays a xed sum to the hospital will incur a negligible loss on account of
patients going untreated. Such an arrangement requires no monitoring of the hospital
and is thus likely to be preferable. In the absence of any variability in both n and c it
is, therefore, clear that W B > W c > W s. Even when there is ex ante uncertainty
regarding the number of patients who will require treatment but there is reasonable
certainty that this number will exceed N , and the purchaser wishes at least N pa-
tients to be treated, a xed budget of cN will achieve the purchasers requirements
at minimal cost in terms of monitoring. We therefore have an empirically testable
conjecture:
Conjecture 1 Health services for which either variation in both cost and numbers
treated are small or variation in cost is small and that are supplied up to a known
capacity of the health care system, will give rise to a greater use of block contracts,
relative to cost or volume dependent alternatives.
Relating this discussion to the categories of services described in Section 2, then
in terms of the existence of binding capacity constraints, both community health
services and, to a lesser degree, non-acute hospital services and mental health services
are noted to be capacity constrained. In relation to variability of demand, mental
health services, on the limited evidence we have, come closest to the requirement of
certain demand.
Turning next to health services for which the capacity constraint is unlikely to
bind and for which variations in cost are small but variations in numbers requiring
to be treated are signicant, it is clear that the cost-per-case arrangement, which
varies payment directly with the number of patients treated and which requires only
monitoring of treatment numbers, is a natural choice. Under this arrangement the
purchaser can achieve ex post rst best treatment numbers, and only if n 0 is large
will the purchaser wish to forgo this in order to save on monitoring costs. Provided,
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therefore, that there is a su¢ ciently large loss to the purchaser of patients being un-
treated, thenW c > W B; because under a block contract, once the providers budget
is exhausted patients will be left untreated. Furthermore, if there is no variability in
cost,W c > W s simply on account of n < c; because under both arrangements the
purchaser can ensure that all patients who actually arrive to be treated are in fact
treated. Hence, under these conditions a cost-per-case contract is likely to be chosen.
Conjecture 2 Provided that the costs of monitoring treatment numbers are not ex-
cessive, health services for which there is a signicant variation in demand and small
variation in costs, will give rise to a greater use of volume-dependent-contracts such
as cost-per-case payments in preference to block contracts.
Potentially any of the broad categories of health services we have described in
Section 2 could conform to the requirements of Conjecture 2 except perhaps com-
munity health services where, as we have noted the costs of monitoring the number
of patients treated may be prohibitive given the di¢ culty of dening the nature of
treatment.
This leaves the kind of ex post arrangement requiring monitoring of costs implied
by sophisticated block contracts  to be the most likely contract of choice when
there is substantial variation in costs, particularly where there is also variation in
the number requiring treatment and where the capacity constraint is unlikely to be
binding. Hence, for completeness we propose,
Conjecture 3 Health services for which there is considerable variation in costs of
treatment, particularly where there is also variation in demand for treatment, will
give rise to a greater use of sophisticated block contracts relative to either simple
block or solely volume dependent contracts.
Of the services we describe in Section 2, acute hospital services appear a natural
candidate for higher than average cost and demand variability.
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3.2 Purchaser and provider characteristics and monitoring
costs
It follows directly from the framework set out in Section 3 that higher monitoring costs
favour the use of simpler contracts the simplest form of contract we observe being
block contracts and the most complex being sophisticated block contracts. Hence,
Conjecture 4 Characteristics of purchasers and / or providers that mitigate moni-
toring costs will give rise to a greater use of volume-dependent and sophisticated block
contracts relative to simple block contracts.
As noted in Section 2 some purchasers of services were GPs who have a number
of distinguishing characteristics as purchasers. First, GPs have detailed information
on their own patients so that for them there is likely to be less ex ante uncertainty
regarding both the number of patients who will require hospital services and perhaps
less uncertainty regarding the cost of treating those patients. Relating this to the
discussion in Section 3.1 suggests that for these purchasers it is more likely that a
block contract will yield the highest welfare. However, an o¤setting tendency exists
if the more intimate knowledge of their patients that GPs possess acts to mitigate
monitoring costs then according to Conjecture 4 either the cost-per-case or sophis-
ticated block contract will yield higher welfare. The impact of the purchaser being a
GP would, therefore, appear ambiguous.
The proximity, both physical and in terms of management structure, of purchaser
and provider can be expected to have a mitigating impact on monitoring costs. It
should be noted that in some cases the hospital provider was previously directly man-
aged by the Health Authority purchaser with which it contracted. For these contracts
the purchaser could use its knowledge of the information systems and management
practices of the hospital concerned to reduce the monitoring costs. In terms of man-
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agement arrangements, hospitals that had not yet attained NHS trust status at the
time of a contract might be expected to be closer to Health Authority in terms of
management structure.
Note, there is no role within our framework for the extent of competition between
providers or purchasers to a¤ect the form of contract chosen. From the perspective
of theory, the extent of competition will a¤ect the total amount that the purchaser
may need to pay in order to satisfy the providers participation constraint and hence
will a¤ect the levels of W B;W c and W s but will not a¤ect the ranking of these.
Conjecture 5 The extent of purchaser or provider competition will not inuence the
adoption of block, volume-dependent or sophisticated block contracts.
4 Empirical Implementation
4.1 Data
We use two sources of data. The rst is physical copies of 236 contracts drawn
from the 1991/92 round of contracting, across 52 purchasers. These data derive from
either computer scanned copies of contracts as retained by the National Association
of Health Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT) or from hard copies of actual contracts
obtained from NAHAT. Our second data set comes from a telephone survey of Health
Authorities from which we derive information on 464 contracts from the 1993/94
round of contract negotiations, across 106 purchasers. Both data sets contain similar
(though not identical) information on contractual form and service type. There are
also additional data on purchaser and provider characteristics that are specic to each
data set.
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4.1.1 Data Set 1
For each contract in the rst data set we extract information on a number of charac-
teristics guided by the model of the previous section. First, the form of the contract
can be categorised into one of four types: block (henceforth, BC, 22%), sophisticated
block (henceforth, SBC, 68%), cost-and-volume and cost-per-case (henceforth, collec-
tively8, VDC, 10%). Since contracts (at this early stage following the reforms) did not
necessarily all specify their form according to this categorisation, we categorised them
by examining their exact terms. Second, we observe the type of services that were
being contracted for, and these are categorised into one of four groups as described in
Section 2.3 : HOSPITAL ACUTE, HOSPITAL NONACUTE, MENTAL HEALTH
and COMMUNITY health services. We denote contracts that cover more than one
of the above service types as MULTIPLE. Third, we observe the name and type of
purchaser (Health Authority or GP) which allows us to construct a GP dummy as
well as a unique purchaser identier. Fourth, we observe whether the provider was in
the same district (within the Health Authority area) as the purchaser  giving rise
to DISTANT PROVIDER  and whether it had NHS TRUST status.9 Finally, we
have information on purchaser and provider density which we use as proxies of market
structure  giving rise to our PROVIDER CONCENTRATION and PURCHASER
CONCENTRATION variables.
8We observe only 8 cost-per-case and 17 cost-and-volume contracts from this cross-section and
therefore aggregate - since both contract forms essentially share the same property of volume de-
pendence - into a singe VDC category.
9At this early stage following the reforms, few hospitals had yet been granted Trust status and
few GPs had yet been granted Fundholder status (see Table 3).
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4.1.2 Data Set 2
In the second data set we also have information on the form of contract but in this
case as reported by the purchaser.10 Hence, in this data set there are three reported
contract forms: BC (23%), SBC (61%) and cost-and-volume, which we term VDC
(16%). By the date of the telephone survey the term sophisticated block contract was
in common usage and although we could not go back and check whether the same
criteria were used in dening these contracts as we had used for the rst data set,
other information on these contracts is consistent with their categorisation.
The type of services contracted for in the second data set are categorised only
as either HOSPITAL ACUTE, or COMMUNITY or MENTAL HEALTH services.
As for data set 1 we know whether the provider was in the same district as the
purchaser so we can again specify a DISTANT PROVIDER dummy. An additional
piece of information for each contract in the second data set is whether clinicians
were present in the contract negotiations giving rise to our variable CLINICIAN
PRESENT. All purchasers in the second data set are Health Authorities for which
we can again specify a unique identier. Table 3 lists the observed variables and
summary statistics are reported in Table 4.
4.2 A Mixed Multinomial Logit Model of Contract Choice
We consider the choice of contract form as being a consequence of the type of service,
purchaser/provider characteristics and a random error term. The natural specication
for such a multiple unordered choice problem is the multinomial logit (MNL) model,
e.g. as adopted by Shepard (1993) in the context of gas station franchising. The
purchasers in our data sets, whether Health Authorities or GPs can be expected
10There are no GP Fundholder contracts in the second data set - all purchasers are Health Au-
thorities.
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to have many unobserved characteristics. In the context of our model these could
correspond to purchasers having di¤erent precise forms for b(nh) or di¤erent weights
for . Ignoring such unobserved heterogeneity leads to biased parameter estimates
in the MNL model (see e.g. Arrelano and Honoré, 2001). Given that we observe
multiple contracts for purchasers in both data sets, we can to some extent control
for such unobserved heterogeneity. We therefore consider a Mixed MNL model by
allowing for random, purchaser-specic intercepts.(see Greene, 2003, pp728-9). 11
We index decision makers (health authorities or GP fundholders) by i 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; Ig
and note that we have a number of instances of contract choice by each decision maker,
that we index by t 2 f1; 2; 3; :::Tg: As described above there are three outcomes of
choice, these are our 3 contract types, that we index by j 2 f1; 2; 3g. The probability
that purchaser i selects contract of type j on the tth instance can be written as
Pijt(i) =
e
0
ixijt
3X
k=1
e
0
ixikt
:
where, given that we have k observed variables (including the constant) relating to
the characteristics of each contract, xijt is a 1 3k vector of observed characteristics
and i is a 1 3k vector of parameters. If we allow for each parameter in this vector
to drawn from a distribution with p parameters (termed the deepparameters in the
literature to distinguish them from the conventional regression parameters) then we
would to need estimate a total of 3k(1 + p) regression parameters.
Instead we consider 2 special cases of the general Mixed MNL model. In the rst
we assume i =  for all i which yields the standard MNL model. In the second case
we assume that only the elements of i corresponding to the contract type-specic
11Fixed e¤ects specications in discrete outcome settings are rarely used due to the problem of
incidental parameters - the xed e¤ects cannot be di¤erenced out - leading to proliferation of
parameters and inconsistency of parameter estimates (see Arrelano and Honoré, 2001) .
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constants vary and thus consider what we term a Random Intercept MNL. Data
limitations preclude the estimation of more general Mixed MNLs
We might also expect unobserved heterogeneity among providers, e.g. provider
reputation, where a goodreputation might reduce monitoring costs over and above
what we capture with our distant provider variables. However, because of the likely
weighting of purchaser and provider preferences in the choice of contract, and be-
cause we observe only single contracts for many providers, we do not take account of
unobserved provider heterogeneity in our extended model.
4.3 Regression Results
The standard MNL model (without random e¤ects) is our starting point, and is
estimated separately on each data set by maximum likelihood. In both data sets
MENTAL HEALTH is the omitted service type variable. Pooling of contract types
(e.g. pooling BC and SBC) is rejected for all possible pair-wise combinations, across
both data sets, according to Cramer-Ridder tests (see Cramer and Ridder, 1991) and
so the MNL specication is supported over binary alternatives. The Hausman tests
fail to reject Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) in all cases, again across
both data sets, providing further support for the MNL specication (see Hausman
and McFadden, 1984). MNL regression coe¢ cients need to be interpreted with care
since they indicate the responsiveness of log-odds ratios and not probabilities. How-
ever, our empirical conjectures - which are couched in relative terms - are most easily
interpreted in terms of these log-odds ratios. We therefore discuss regression coe¢ -
cients in preference to marginal e¤ects but include the latter for completeness. Table
5 summarises the regression coe¢ cients for the rst data set and Table 6 those for
the second data set: marginal e¤ects12 are reported in Tables 7 and 8 respectively.
12The marginal e¤ects for both models were computed using a Monte Carlo simulation. For
each model 10,000 draws from the distributions of parameters were made, and for each draw the
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In these, and all subsequent, tables an * denotes signicant at the 95% level.
We then estimate the mixed MNLmodel allowing for purchaser-specic intercepts,
again separately on each data set, by maximum simulated likelihood13 . Regression
coe¢ cients for this extended model are reported14 in Tables 9 and 10: marginal e¤ects
are reported in Tables 11 and 12 respectively. The mixed MNL estimates suggest the
presence of signicant unobserved purchaser heterogeneity in both data sets, and
log-likelihoods are considerably higher for the mixed MNL models compared to the
standard MNL models so that conventional Likelihood Ratio tests would favour the
mixed MNL models. Although the parameter estimates from the standard MNL and
mixed MNL models are qualitatively similar - e.g. in terms of statistical signicance
and signs - in most respects, there are quantitative di¤erences, and some qualitative
di¤erences, which may indicate bias in the standard MNL model. The following
discussion, therefore, concentrates on the mixed MNL estimates, although most of
the conclusions also hold for the standard MNL estimates. For convenience in Table 2
we summarise the statistically signicant (95%) e¤ects of variables, across both data
sets, on the relative likelihood of di¤erent contract types.
Our framework suggests (Conjectures 2 and 3) that contracts for acute services
are more likely to entail volume dependency and cost dependency than contracts
for mental health services. In both data sets, this is conrmed by the regression
results the log-odds ratios of both SBC and VDC, relative to BC, are signicantly
increased by ACUTE HOSPITAL. In data set 1, and consistent with Conjecture
marginal e¤ect was computed. The reported standard errors are the standard deviations of the
resulting distributions for the marginal e¤ects.
13We used NLOGIT and, as a check for robustness, the GLLAMM package for Stata (see Rabe-
Hesketh et al, 2004). Random e¤ects are assumed to be distributed according to the binomial
distribution. Results are robust to alternative specications, e.g. normally distributed random
e¤ects.
14We report the mean of the purchaser specic random intercepts for (PURCHASER INTER-
CEPTS 1 and 2) and the associated estimated variance of these terms. Variance statistically di¤erent
from zero indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis of purchaser specic heterogeneity.
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Table 2: Summary of the e¤ects of variables on the relative likelihood of di¤erent
forms of contract
Likelihood Likelihood Likelihood
of SBC of VDC of VDC
Variable relative to BC relative to BC relative to SBC
HOSPITAL ACUTE + +
HOSPITAL NONACUTE 
COMMUNITY  
MULTIPLE SERVICES + +
GP 
NHS TRUST  
PURCHASER CONC.
PROVIDER CONC.
DISTANT PROVIDER + +
CLINICIAN PRESENT + 
DISTANT PROVIDER
3, HOSPITAL NONACUTE increases the log odds-ratio of SBC relative to BC:
this e¤ect is signicant for the MNL model and maintains the same sign but is not
signicant in the mixed MNL estimates. In the context of our model, this could
reect greater uncertainty over the cost per treatment or lower monitoring costs for
these services relative to MENTAL HEALTH services.
According to Conjecture 1 contracts for COMMUNITY SERVICES should be less
likely to use VDC and SBC than contracts for MENTAL HEALTH services. Again,
the regression results generally support this: In both data sets the log-odds ratios
of VDC relative to BC are lower for COMMUNITY SERVICES contracts and this
e¤ect is signicant for data set 2. In the rst data set, but not the second, there is
also a marginally signicant negative impact on the log odds ratio of SBC relative to
BC.
MULTIPLE SERVICES (only found in data set 1) signicantly increases the log-
odds ratios of both SBC or VDC relative to BC. Again, these e¤ects are consistent
with Conjectures 2 and 3 reecting a desire for greater volume dependency and cost
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dependency where numbers treated and cost per case are uncertain ex ante. This shift
away from BC suggests (as we might expect given their relative weights in overall
Health Authority expenditure) that acute services may outweigh other services in
these broad service contracts.
Our model suggests (Conjecture 4) that a provider that is in some way (either
physically or in terms of motivation) distant from the purchaser will be more likely
to be contracted with BC than SBC or VDC because of higher monitoring costs.
Our two variables here are NHS TRUST and DISTANT PROVIDER, both of which
we might expect to have similar signed e¤ects, but this is not borne out unambigu-
ously in the regression estimates. In data set 1, whilst it is true that NHS TRUST
(marginally) signicantly reduces the log-odds ratio of SBC to BC, the opposite is
the case for DISTANT PROVIDER, which increases the likelihood of SBC or VDC
relative to BC. Interpreted in the context of our model this suggests that DISTANT
PROVIDER may not be a good proxy for monitoring costs. One possible expla-
nation is that contracts with physically distant providers in data set 1 may be for
di¤erent, perhaps more specialised, health services that are not available within the
local Health Authority area, for example the services of severe burns units. DISTANT
PROVIDER may therefore act as a proxy for these types of services, and this e¤ect
(uncertainty regarding c and n), over and above that of the general acute services
variable, is outweighing any monitoring costs e¤ects. Further detailed breakdown
of service types might help us explore this question further, but additional data are
required for this. In data set 2, DISTANT PROVIDER takes the predicted negative
sign for both log odds comparisons, but is statistically insignicant. Note that the
nature of the telephone survey on which data set 2 is based - focusing on larger con-
tracts for each of the three service types - means that small contracts for specialised
services are unlikely to be included in the sample.
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Our prediction for the e¤ect of a purchaser being a GP with respect to contract
form is ambiguous. Two competing Conjectures (1 and 4) are suggested by our
framework  lower monitoring costs, leading to an increased use of SBC and more
certainty regarding c and n giving rise to an increased use of BC. The regression
results are consistent with the view that certainty regarding c and n is the dominant
e¤ect: the log-odds ratio of SBC relative to BC is signicantly reduced by GP, and
GP takes a negative sign, but is not statistically signicant, for the log-odds ratio of
VDC relative to BC.
CLINICIAN PRESENT in contract negotiations increases the log-odds ratio of
SBC to BC (borderline signicant) and signicantly reduces the log-odds ratio of
VDC to SBC. Interpreted in the context of our framework this suggests that the
presence of clinicians is associated with a lower c:
Finally our measures of purchaser and provider concentration, included as addi-
tional controls in data set 1 were predicted (Conjecture 5) not to have an inuence
on contract form. The coe¢ cients for these variables, which are admittedly imperfect
proxies for competition, appear consistent with this prediction: neither signicantly
inuences any of the log-odds ratios. Fenn et al. (1994) and Csaba and Fenn (1997)
suggest that purchaser competition  in a capacity constrained health care system
 might lead purchasers to set contracts that secure a number of beds at local hos-
pitals ex ante. The lack of evidence for such behaviour here using data from one
year earlier than Csaba and Fenn (1997) may reect the poor quality of our concen-
tration measures but is also consistent with purchasers learning the need for supply
assurance only slowly over time.
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5 Discussion
At the time contracts were initiated in the NHS there was considerable scepticism
as to the degree of sophistication which purchasers and providers would bring to the
contract negotiations. However, the view that contracts are chosen arbitrarily, or en-
tirely at the whim of individual purchasers, is rejected by the data we have considered.
Instead, the results discussed above exhibit statistically signicant e¤ects, across two
independent data sets, that are consistent with our simple agency framework of choice
of contractual form in the NHS. Specically, we show that the nature of the services
being contracted for, purchaser characteristics and provider characteristics all have
signicant e¤ects on the forms of contract chosen.
The present study thus supports the view that contractual form is systematically
related to exogenous factors consistent with the predictions of contract theory and
does so in a context where the motivation of economic decision makers is largely seen
as not-for-prot (Newhouse, 1970). In also showing how the nature of the health
services being contracted for is related to contractual form, we extend the existing
evidence in support of contract theory. Furthermore, the data that we have considered
were generated in the immediate aftermath of the adoption of a contractual system
and thus our analysis nds evidence to support the view that even a newly established
contractual system results in rational choice of contract form.
The ndings of this research have a number of implications for health care policy.
In both the British NHS and many other health care systems, including US Medicare,
there has been a movement away from payment systems that reimburse health care
providers according to the cost of the services they deliver. The motivation for that
movement is based upon the perceived incentive benets of payment systems that
ensure that providers of service are residual claimants over any cost savings they
achieve. For example the current English NHS under a system termed Payment by
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Results prescribes contracts that specify a xed price per treatment, i.e. cost per
case. Contract theory, however, provides a number of justications for incorporating
an element of cost reimbursement into an optimal payment system and we have
found that purchasers in the British NHS, when given a choice, were willing to allow
ex post adjustment of payment to reect cost in circumstances consistent with those
theoretical justications. This suggests a tension between the intentions of policy
makers and the incentives of purchasing agencies. Recently, Audit Commission (2005,
paragraph 149) has found evidence of such tensions in the arrangements between
purchasers and providers, which in some cases continue to contain elements of cost
dependency.
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Table 3: Variable Denitions
Variable Description
Service Types
HOSPITAL ACUTE 1 if the contract is for acute services
HOSPITAL NONACUTE 1 if the contract is for hospital non-acute services
MENTAL HEALTH 1 if the contract is for mental health services
COMMUNITY 1 if the contract is for community services
MULTIPLE 1 if the contract is for more than one service type
Provider/Purchaser Characteristics
NHS TRUST if the contract is with an NHS Trust hospital
DISTANT PROVIDER if the provider is outside the Health Authoritys boundary
GP 1 if the purchaser is a GP
PURCHASER CONCENTRATION Number of GP Fundholders per 100,000 population
PROVIDER CONCENTRATION Number of providers of similar services within 10 miles
Characteristics of negotiations
CLINICIAN PRESENT 1 if clinicians present in the contract negotiations
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Sample Mean (Std. Dev.)
Data Set 1 Data Set 2
HOSPITAL ACUTE 0.20 0.33
HOSPITAL NONACUTE 0.23 n/a
MENTAL HEALTH 0.22 0.35
COMMUNITY 0.20 0.32
MULTIPLE 0.15 n/a
NHS TRUST 0.04 n/a
DISTANT PROVIDER 0.16 0.14
GP 0.07 n/a
PURCHASER CONCENTRATION 0.51 (0.52) n/a
PROVIDER CONCENTRATION 2.01 (5.33) n/a
CLINICIAN PRESENT n/a 0.57
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 236 464
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Table 5: Coe¢ cent Estimates, MNL Data Set 1
SBC VDC VDC
relative to BC relative to BC relative to SBC
Variable coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE .917 (.617) 2.120 (.830)* 1.204 (.669)
HOSPITAL NONACUTE 1.854 (.732)* 1.478 (1.035) -.376 (.823)
COMMUNITY -.714 (.477) -2.020 (1.200) -1.306 (1.167)
MULTIPLE SERVICES 1.668 (.791)* 1.834 (1.042) .166 (.787)
GP -3.407 (1.068)* -2.328 (1.398) 1.079 (1.117)
NHS TRUST -1.811 (.841)* -1.426 (1.372) .385 (1.268)
PURCHASER CONC. -.080 (.457) -0.727 (.645) -0.647 (.545)
PROVIDER CONC. .252 (.155) -.007 (.226) -.259 (.178)
DISTANT PROVIDER 2.627 (.937)* 3.340 (1.084)* .713 (.644)
constant .595 (.518) -1.102 (.794) -1.671 (.690)*
No. of observations 236
Log likelihood -153.72
Pseudo R2 .210
Table 6: Coe¢ cient Estimates MNL Data Set 2
SBC VDC VDC
relative to BC relative to BC relative to SBC
Variable coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE 2.269 (.455)* 2.628 (.512)* 0.359 (.324)
COMMUNITY -.213 (.257) -0.480 (.401) -0.267 (.381)
CLINICIAN PRESENT .740 (.244)* -.197 (.325) -.936 (.272)*
DISTANT PROVIDER -.454 (.442) -.330 (.515) 0.123 (.365)
constant .266 (.229) -.706 (.306)* -.972 (.281)*
No. of observations 464
Log likelihood -391.66
Pseudo R2 .093
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Table 7: Marginal E¤ects, MNL Data Set 1
Change Change Change
in Probability in Probability in Probability
of BC of SBC of VDC
With Respect to coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std.error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE -0.090 (0.062) -0.032 (0.169) 0.122 (173)
HOSPITAL NONACUTE -0.143 (0.07)* 0.155 (0.147) -0.012 (0.14)
COMMUNITY 0.102 (0.128) -0.033 (0.163) -0.068 (0.109)
MULTIPLE SERVICES -0.121 (0.068) 0.099 (0.168) 0.022 (0.159)
GP 0.645 (0.196)* -0.626 (0.190)* -0.018 (0.147)
NHS TRUST 0.319 (0.171) -0.313 (0.191) -0.006 (0.151)
PURCHASER CONC. 0.014 (0.052) 0.030 (0.093) 0.044 (0.078)
PROVIDER CONC. -0.027 (0.018) 0.043 (0.034) -0.016 (0.029)
DISTANT PROVIDER -0.163 (0.084)* 0.087 (0.210) 0.076 (0.204)
Table 8: Marginal E¤ects MNL Data Set 2
Change Change Change
in Probability in Probability in Probability
of BC of SBC of VDC
With Respect to coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std.error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE -0.278 (0.048)* 0.171 (0.13) 0.107 (0.125)
COMMUNITY 0.040 (0.059) 0.001 (0.101) -0.041 (0.061)
CLINICIAN PRESENT -0.082 (0.031)* 0.178 (0.074)* -0.094 (0.073)
DISTANT PROVIDER 0.069 (0.043) -0.071 (0.079) 0.002 (0.073)
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Table 9: Coe¢ cient Estimates Mixed MNL Data Set 1
SBC VDC VDC
relative to BC relative to BC relative to SBC
Variable coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE 3.951 (1.323)* 6.6343 (2.715)* 1.777 (1.508)
HOSPITAL NONACUTE 1.587 (1.132) 2.801 (1.880) 0.159 (1.468)
COMMUNITY -1.330 (.967) -1.046 (2.054) -0.591 (1.726)
MULTIPLE SERVICES 3.437 (1.559)* 5.869 (2.679)* 1.347 (1.620)
GP -7.175 (3.219)* -3.596 (3.164) 1.764 (2.251)
NHS TRUST -3.512 (2.032) -0.095 (1.747) 2.306 (2.176)
PURCHASER CONC. -.549 (1.312) -1.572 (1.937) -1.022 (1.362)
PROVIDER CONC. .287 (.279) 0.016 (.333) -0.263 (.253)
DISTANT PROVIDER 5.919 (2.318)* 6.860 (2.831)* 1.078 (1.106)
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 1 -4.499 (2.678)
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 2 1.292 (1.476)
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 1 VARIANCE 4.212 (2.751)
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 2 VARIANCE 4.510 (1.698)*
No. of observations 236
Log likelihood -129.18
Table 10: Coe¢ cient Estimates Mixed MNL Data Set 2
SBC VDC VDC
relative to BC relative to BC relative to SBC
Variable coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE 3.278 (.624)* 4.096 (.784)* 1.109 (.609)
COMMUNITY -.030 (.363) -1.273 (.581)* -1.069 (.675)
CLINICIAN PRESENT 1.360 (.489)* -0.064 (.760) -1.274 (.695)
DISTANT PROVIDER -.759 (.702) 0.414 (.852) 1.039 (.714)
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 1 -3.301 (1.056)*
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 1 0.553 (0.496)
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 1 VARIANCE 4.182 (0.912)*
PURCHASER INTERCEPT 2 VARIANCE 2.738 (0.479)*
No. of observations 464
Log likelihood -301.23
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Table 11: Marginal E¤ects, Mixed MNL Data Set 1
Change Change Change
in Probability in Probability in Probability
of BC of SBC of VDC
With Respect to coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std.error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE -0.075 (0.081) -0.027 (0.204) 0.048 (0.213)
HOSPITAL NONACUTE -0.040 (0.047) 0.029(0.104) 0.011 (0.107)
COMMUNITY 0.070 (0.104) -0.071 (0.135) 0.001 (0.086)
MULTIPLE SERVICES -0.058 (0.066) 0.015 (0.201) 0.043 (0.209)
GP 0.941 (0.154)* -0.940 (0.14)* -0.001 (0.081)
NHS TRUST 0.452 (0.213)* -0.520 (0.229)* 0.068 (0.166)
PURCHASER CONC. 0.019 (0.054) -0.013 (0.073) -0.006 (0.048)
PROVIDER CONC. -0.011 (0.012) 0.013 (0.017) -0.002 (0.011)
DISTANT PROVIDER -0.088 (0.089) 0.080 (0.160) 0.008 (0.154)
Table 12: Marginal E¤ects Mixed MNL Data Set 2
Change Change Change
in Probability in Probability in Probability
of BC of SBC of VDC
With Respect to coe¢ cient (std. error) coe¢ cient (std.error) coe¢ cient (std. error)
HOSPITAL ACUTE -0.227 (0.100)* 0.216 (0.112)* 0.011 (0.074)
COMMUNITY 0.021 (0.084) -0.013 (0.094) -0.008 (0.032)
CLINICIAN PRESENT -0.128 (0.061)* 0.142 (0.073)* -0.014 (0.033)
DISTANT PROVIDER 0.079 (0.074) -0.094 (0.103) 0.015 (0.070)
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